AN RE-INTRODUCTION TO THE COUP 
                Why this coup breaks the mold. 
                Typically, when we think of a coup d’état we envision a  military assault on the government; we think of tanks and soldiers storming the  president’s house or palace; we think of the overthrow of Salvador Allende in  Chile in 1973 or the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954; and we  know it’s a pretty safe bet that if the coup is against an anti-US or socialist  president, then the US government is probably involved—as it was in both Chile  and Guatemala.  
                At first glance, the 2002 coup against Hugo Chávez seems to  fit nicely into this mold. Indeed, when I returned to Venezuela  in September 2002, five months after the coup, I was quite confident it did.  After all, Hugo Chávez had already forged  very close ties with Cuba  as well as Iraq,  Iran, and Libya.  He was also speaking out against the U.S.  invasion of Afghanistan.  With Venezuela  as the fifth largest supplier of oil to the U.S.,  it made sense that the United States  would want to get rid of him.  The fact  that the military installed a former oil company executive, Pedro Carmona, as  interim-president helped solidify my opinion that the coup was about ensuring  that one of America’s most stable suppliers of oil was not lost. 
                Then, of course, there was the movie, The Revolution Will Not be Televised, which appeared to confirm  exactly what I suspected.  It played  foreboding music when US  government officials came on camera, it showed tanks rolling down the street  during the coup, it said that military snipers had killed anti-Chávez marchers and  government supporters to spark a coup, and it showed how the opposition media  had tried to stifle news of Chávez’s illegal imprisonment. It all fit together  so nicely with my own preconceived notions of what a coup was.  
                Yet, while it was clear that the military had broken the law  and that the US  had applauded an undemocratic regime change, there were still a lot of things  that didn’t fit the mold. 
                Consider these problematic facts: 
                
                  - The crisis       was sparked by an afternoon of street violence wherein 19 people died and       over 150 were wounded. The photographs and images from the violence showed       pro-Chávez gunmen (many identified as government employees) firing toward       the opposition march.  There were       also pictures of National Guard troops (loyal to Chávez) also shooting at       the march.  But where were the       photographs and videos of the snipers that The Revolution Will Not be Televised claimed were       responsible? 
 
                 
                
                  - How       was this a “classic coup” if the military never launched an attack?  Indeed, when the violence began the head       of the army, General Vásquez Velasco, ordered a nationwide lockdown.  
 
                 
                
                  - If the       Chávez government was the victim of a coup, then why was it the one who cut the signals of       all of the TV stations, thereby blocking out coverage of what was       happening? 
 
                 
                
                  - Why       did the Venezuela Supreme Court—which was entirely appointed by Chávez’s       party—rule that there had been no coup at all, but rather a power vacuum       precipitated by the executive branch?
 
                 
                
                  - Perhaps       most importantly, if the Venezuelan government was the victim, then why       did it launch a major cover-up after the coup?  Why did it suspend the Truth Commission,       destroy evidence, and fire police detectives and prosecutors who tried to       investigate what had happened?
 
                 
                Clearly something very unusual had happened; perhaps something  a lot more interesting than your “classic coup.”  So I set out to find out what it was.  What I learned was that no one was completely  innocent, and that the government, the military, and the opposition leaders had  all broken the law.     
                What I had originally believed turned out to be very wrong,  so in many ways my investigation into the coup marked a personal transition for  me; it marked a transition from believing what I wanted to believe, to acknowledging  the truth, regardless of how inconvenient it was or how uncomfortable it was or  how it might contradict my ideological beliefs.  
                When I began my work I quickly realized that the first step  in understanding the coup was understanding the violence.  Because whoever had initiated the violence  around Chávez’s palace bore the brunt of the responsibility for the way the  crisis unfolded.  
                Next: Understanding how the violence began.   |